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ABSTRACT
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With the help of recent technological advancements especially in the last decade, it
has become much easier to extensively and remotely observe medical conditions of the
patients. This observation is done through wearable devices named biosensors that act as
connected nodes on the Body Area Network (BAN). The main goal of these biosensors
is to collect and provide critical and sensitive health data concerning the host individual,
communicate with each other in order to make decisions based on what has been captured
and relay the collected data to remote healthcare professionals. The sensitive nature of this
critical data makes it extremely important to process it as securely as possible. Biosen-
sors communicate with each other through wireless medium that is vulnerable to potential
security attacks. Therefore, secure mechanisms for both data protection and intra-BAN
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communication are needed. Moreover, these mechanisms should be lightweight in order
to overcome the hardware resource restrictions of biosensors. Random and secure cryp-
tographic key generation and agreement among the biosensors take place at the core of
these security mechanisms.
In this thesis, we propose SKA-PSAR (Secure Key Agreement Using Physiological
Signals with Augmented Randomness) system. The main goal of this system is to pro-
duce highly random cryptographic keys for the biosensors for secure communication in a
BAN. Similar to its predecessor SKA-PS protocol by Karaog˘lan Altop et al., SKA-PSAR
also employs physiological signals, such as heart rate and blood pressure, as inputs for the
keys and utilizes the set reconciliation mechanism as basic building block. Novel quan-
tization and binarization methods of the Secure Key Agreement Protocol of the proposed
SKA-PSAR system distinguish it from SKA-PS in a way that the former has increased
the randomness of the generated keys. In addition, the generated cryptographic keys in
our proposed SKA-PSAR system have distinctive and time variant characteristics as well
as long enough bit sizes that can be considered resistant against a cryptographic attack.
Moreover, correct key generation rate of 100% and false key generation rate of 0% have
been obtained. Last but not least, results of the computational complexity, communication
complexity and memory requirements of our proposed system are quite higher as com-
pared to SKA-PS, but this is a cost that needs to be paid for achieving high randomness
level.
iv
O¨ZET
GO¨VDE ALAN AG˘LARININ GU¨VENLI˙G˘I˙ I˙C¸I˙N
FI˙ZYOLOJI˙K SI˙NYALLER KULLANILARAK
SO¨ZDE RASGELE ANAHTARLAR OLUS¸TURULMASI
BESTE SEYMEN
Master Tezi, Ocak 2019
Danıs¸man: Prof. Dr. Albert Levi
Es¸-Danıs¸man: Dr. Duygu Karaog˘lan Altop
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: Kriptografik Anahtar U¨retimi, Go¨vde Alan Ag˘larında Ag˘
Gu¨venlig˘i, Fizyolojik Sinyaller, Anahtar Mutabakatı, Biyo-kriptografi
Son yıllarda yas¸anan teknolojik gelis¸melerin yardımıyla, hastaların sag˘lık durumlarını
uzaktan go¨zlemleyebilmek kolaylas¸tı. Hastaların go¨zlemlenmesi “biyosenso¨r” adı ver-
ilen ve go¨vde alan ag˘ında birbirine bag˘lı du¨g˘u¨mler halinde bulunan giyilebilir cihazlar
ile yapılmaktadır. Biyosenso¨rlerin en o¨nemli go¨revleri bag˘lı bulunulan kis¸iden hassas
ve kritik verilerin toplanması, toplanan verilerin biyosenso¨rler arasında iletis¸im kuru-
larak analiz edilmesi ve ardından sag˘lık c¸alıs¸anlarına go¨nderilmesidir. Toplanan veri-
lerin hassas veriler olması nedeniyle veriler u¨zerinde yapılan is¸lemlerin gu¨venli olması
gerekmektedir. Biyosenso¨rler gu¨venlik saldırılarına ac¸ık olan kablosuz ag˘ u¨zerinden
iletis¸im kurmaktadırlar. Bu nedenle, verilerin korunması ve go¨vde alan ag˘ı ic¸erisindeki
iletis¸imin gu¨venlig˘inin sag˘lanması ic¸in bir gu¨venlik mekanizması gerekmektedir. Buna ek
v
olarak, biyosenso¨rlerin donanımsal kaynak kısıtlamalarının u¨stesinden gelinebilmesi ic¸in
olus¸turulan gu¨venlik mekanizması fazla kaynak gerektirmemelidir. Kriptografik anahtar
olus¸umu ve biyosenso¨rler arası anahtar anlas¸masının rasgele ve gu¨venli olması, bu gu¨venlik
mekanizmalarının en o¨nemli o¨g˘elerindendir.
Bu tezde, fizyolojik sinyaller kullanılarak gu¨venli ve rasgelelig˘i arttırılmıs¸ anahtar
anlas¸ması sistemi (SKA-PSAR) o¨nerilmis¸tir. Bu sistemin temel amacı biyosenso¨rlerin
go¨vde alan ag˘ları ic¸erisinde gu¨venli iletis¸im sag˘layabilmesi ic¸in rasgelelig˘i yu¨ksek krip-
tografik anahtarlar u¨retmektir. SKA-PSAR sistemi de, o¨ncu¨lu¨ Karaog˘lan Altop vd. tarafından
o¨nerilen SKA-PS protokolu¨ gibi, fizyolojik sinyalleri (kalp atıs¸ hızı, kan basıncı, vb.) girdi
olarak kullanmakta ve temel yapı tas¸ı olarak ku¨me uzlas¸ması mekanizmasından yarar-
lanmaktadır. Yeni nicemleme ve ikililes¸tirme mekanizmaları ile daha rasgele anahtarlar
u¨retilebilmesi, SKA-PSAR sistemini SKA-PS protolu¨nden ayırmaktadır. Bununla be-
raber, SKA-PSAR sistemi tarafından olus¸turulan anahtarlar ayırt edicilik ve zamansal
deg˘is¸im o¨zelliklerini tas¸ımakta ve aynı zamanda yeterince uzun bit uzunlukları ile krip-
tografik ataklara kars¸ı dayanıklılık go¨stermektedir. Buna ek olarak, %100 dog˘ru anahtar
olus¸turma yu¨zdesi ve %0 yanlıs¸ anahtar olus¸turma yu¨zdesi elde edilmis¸tir. Son olarak,
o¨nerilen protokolu¨n hesaplama karmas¸ıklıg˘ı, iletis¸im karmas¸ıklıg˘ı and hafıza gereklilik-
leri SKA-PS protokolu¨ne go¨re yu¨ksek c¸ıkmıs¸tır; fakat yu¨ksek rasgelelik ic¸eren anahtarlar
olus¸turulması ic¸in bu gereklidir.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Rapid technological advancements in recent history have allowed medical patients’
ongoing conditions and well-being to be observed in real-time through the use of small,
low-power wearable devices named biosensors. Biosensors act as connected nodes on the
body in a network named Body Area Network (BAN) [27, 47, 43]. Through these bio-
sensors, a BAN thoroughly collects critical medical information (blood pressure, heart
rate, etc.) about the subject in real-time, sends them to remote healthcare professionals,
allowing decisions to be made by the professionals based on what has been captured.
It is important to note that a BAN operates in a wireless environment. Due to this,
even though it becomes much easier to remotely monitor the patient and acquire data,
several other challenges also come up. Wireless networks are much more susceptible to
outside attacks [41] and the critical nature of the stored information makes it extremely
important to provide a secure network. This network should satisfy all principles of in-
formation security – confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). Any security issue in
the system, which causes the patient’s critical information to be disclosed, may result in
the patient being harmed in various ways. For instance, illness of a high-profile individual
might be made public that negatively affects his/her life. In another hypothetical scenario,
a patient whose heart rate rapidly increases may not receive critical help due to an attacker
rigging the network in a way that disguises this sudden change. As a result, BANs must
be secured using a lightweight security mechanism.
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1.1 Motivation
Biosensors are responsible for sending the collected sensitive information to a central
server that is responsible for storing the data and sharing it with health professionals when
necessary. Normally, a designated gateway is used to relay data towards central servers
and multihop communication may be needed to reach the gateway in a BAN. Also, for
pre-evaluations, the data may sometimes be collected to one of the biosensors. There-
fore, a secure communication channel between the biosensors is obligatory. Although it
is extremely critical for the communication of biosensors in a BAN to be as secure as
possible, the power and memory constraints of the biosensors make BAN unsuitable for
traditional cryptographic key generation algorithms, such as the ones using public key
cryptography. Due to these constraints, a mechanism that makes the use of lightweight
key generation protocols for providing the security of communication between biosensors
must be employed. Due to limited input and output capabilities of the BAN devices, it
would be very helpful if the key generation process is automatized. Utilizing biometrics
of the individuals in the aforementioned protocol not only provides automation in key
generation, but also produced cryptographic keys become unique to the individuals and
differ from person to person. Randomness is one of the most essential characteristics of
the cryptographic keys. The cryptographic keys generated from the biometric sources
may suffer having sufficient randomness.
There are studies in the literature [44, 17] that tackle some of these characteristics,
however a comprehensive protocol that satisfies the hardware and security constraints,
especially with adequate randomness of the resulting cryptographic keys, does not exist.
2
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a secure key agreement system that
produces highly random keys for the communication between the biosensors in a BAN.
For this purpose, we propose SKA-PSAR (Secure Key Agreement Using Physiological
Signals with Augmented Randomness) system, which is based on SKA-PS [17] proto-
col. SKA-PSAR system is composed of three main parts: (i) IPI Sequence Generation
Technique, (ii) Secure IPI Sequence Reconciliation (SISR) protocol and (iii) Secure Key
Agreement (SKA) protocol. SKA-PSAR system uses physiological signals (blood pres-
sure, electrocardiogram) on communicating biosensors as inputs and outputs the same
symmetric cryptographic key on the communicating biosensors while utilizing the set rec-
onciliation paradigm similarly as they are used in SKA-PS [17]. Moreover, as in SKA-PS,
SKA-PSAR also relies on the fact that biosensors placed on the same individual generates
similar IPI (Inter-Pulse Interval) values; in other words, the distance between the calcu-
lated peaks of the physiological signals are almost identical. SKA-PSAR differs from
SKA-PS in that it generates more random keys as the result of the novel quantization and
binarization methods.
We evaluated our proposed system on correct key generation rate, false key generation
rate, randomness, distinctiveness, temporal variance, computational complexity, commu-
nication complexity and memory requirements in a comparative way with SKA-PS. Ran-
domness of the generated keys are evaluated using NIST Test Suite [5]. Hamming Dis-
tance metric is utilized to calculate the distinctiveness and the temporal variance of the
generated keys. Performance evaluations are measured on Macbook Pro and Raspberry
Pi3. All these analyses show that correct key generation rates are high while false key
generation does not exist in both models. SKA-PSAR system not only creates highly
random cryptographic keys, but also generates long, time variant and distinctive crypto-
graphic keys. On the other hand, the keys generated by SKA-PS possess lower random-
ness as compared to SKA-PSAR. The computational and communication complexities,
and memory requirements are much higher in SKA-PSAR, but this should be considered
as a trade-off between randomness and operational performance.
3
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 includes the background in-
formation for understanding the basis of the work and also the related work. In Chapter 3,
we explain our proposed SKA-PSAR system that produces highly random cryptographic
keys. Chapter 4 evaluates the performance of our proposed SKA-PSAR system on correct
key generation rate, false key generation rate, computational complexity, communication
complexity and memory requirements together with the randomness, time variance and
distinctiveness of the generated keys. In Section 5, the differences between our proposed
SKA-PSAR system and its predecessor SKA-PS protocol are discussed. Finally, Chap-
ter 6 provides conclusions reached by this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we first explain the Body Area Networks (BANs) with their infras-
tructure, application areas, and security and privacy concerns in Section 2.1. Then, we
define biometrics with the performance evaluation methods in Section 2.2. After that,
physiological signals that are used in health monitoring are explained and depicted in
Section 2.3. Thereafter, the basic cryptographic building blocks of our proposed system,
which are set reconciliation and HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code), are
explained in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5, respectively. Finally, in Section 2.6, we discuss
about the related work in the literature: We first explain the usage of bio-cryptography in
BAN security, and we discuss the key generation methods that utilize physiological sig-
nals, including the details of the SKA-PS protocol [17], on which our proposed protocol
is built.
2.1 Body Area Networks (BANs)
BANs are wireless sensor networks that utilize wearable devices [22, 30, 21], used in
healthcare [10, 46], entertainment [1] and military areas [32]. A BAN consists of Body
Sensor Units (BSU) and a Body Central Unit (BCU). The former is named biosensor and
the functionality of it includes the monitoring of the health of the subject by sensing phys-
iological signals, such as blood pressure (BP) or electrocardiogram (ECG), or by sensing
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the motion of the subject. The latter is named an aggregator and it serves as a data collec-
tor. The aggregator also communicates with a central server that is responsible for storing
the data collected from the biosensors. In addition to these, the general infrastructure of a
BAN also includes a health professional, whose responsibility is retrieving and analyzing
the data from the central server. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the general infrastructure of a
BAN.
central server
patient
biosensor
(BSU)
health professional
aggregator
(BCU)
Figure 2.1: General infrastructure of a BAN
There are two kinds of communications in a BAN: intra-BAN and beyond-BAN. Intra-
BAN communication involves the communication among the biosensor, and between the
biosensors and the aggregator. On the other hand, beyond-BAN communication defines
the communication between the central server and the aggregator. In this thesis, beyond-
BAN communication will not be in scope.
Since biosensors are communicating with each other using wireless medium, they are
prone to both passive and active attacks [41]. A passive attack might violate the confiden-
tiality and the privacy of the collected data and this might result in the data being public
and accessible by non-authorized people. An active attack might destroy the integrity,
authentication and non-repudiation by enabling the intruder to modify the content or the
sender of the data. Since healthcare information is extremely critical and should not be
compromised under any means, a security solution is of great importance.
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BCUs, such as mobile phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs), are assumed to
have more memory and computational power than the BSUs [49]. However, BSUs have
limited memory and low computational power compared to BCUs. Due to the power and
memory constraints of the biosensors, public key cryptography is not suitable for intra-
BAN communications. Therefore, a light-weight secure key creation protocol is needed.
2.2 Biometrics
Biometrics is the study of methods that analyses the human characteristics [29]. One
of the important differences between the biometrics and the conventional cryptography is
that the traditional cryptography requires to have a known secret, such as a password, or a
possession, like a key, while biometrics provides security using distinctive characteristics
of individuals. Another difference of biometrics is that it cannot be lost, stolen, forgot-
ten or transferred as the conventional cryptographic keys can be. The biometrics can be
classified into distinctive characteristics and behavioral characteristics. The examples of
distinctive characteristics are fingerprint, iris recognition and face recognition, and the
examples of behavioral characteristics are the gait features and signature.
The performance of a biometric system can be measured using the metrics False Ac-
cept Rate (FAR), False Reject Rate (FRR), and Equal Error Rate (EER). FAR is defined as
authenticating an unauthorized person, while FRR is being unable to authenticate an au-
thorized person, and EER is described as the rate that both FRR and FAR are equal to each
other. There is a tradeoff between the FAR and FRR. Figure 2.2 represents the matching
scores based on the similarity measure, which is used to decide if the two biometric trait
samples are obtained from the same individual. The right curve in Figure 2.2 illustrates
the similarity scores of biometric features obtained from the same individual and the left
curve illustrates the similarity scores of biometric features of different persons. Threshold
is used to determine the trade off between FAR and FRR.
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Figure 2.2: Matching scores of biometrics (retrieved from [34])
2.3 Physiological Signals in Health Monitoring
Physiological signals such as blood pressure (BP), electrocardiogram (ECG), oxygen
saturation (PPG), body temperature (BT), ballistocardiogram (BCG) and posture muscle
activation (EMG) are being utilized in health monitoring systems in order to keep track
of the patients’ health status.
ECG, which is the graphical representation of electrical activity of the heart in a time
period, is one of the most crucial body signals for detecting signs of hearth diseases [12].
It is measured using electrodes placed on different parts of the body of an individual. On
the other hand, BP is defined as the pressure of the blood on the walls of blood vessels
and increase in BP indicates a heavy workload of the individual’s heart. The common
characteristics of these signals, BP and ECG, is that they represent the cardiac cycle of a
human [6]. IPI (inter-pulse interval) is an important indicator in all of these cardiovascular
signals and is defined as the time elapsed between the consecutive nerve impulses. The
representations of these signals and the concept of IPI can be seen in Figure 2.3. ECG
and BP signals are utilized in this thesis since our dataset includes these aforementioned
signals.
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Figure 2.3: ECG-PPG-BP Signals (retrieved from [16])
2.4 Set Reconciliation
Set reconciliation is an approach that enables to reconcile similar sets on different
hosts while minimizing the computational and communication complexity [25]. Consid-
ering Host A and Host B, each having a set of length b bitstrings, SA and SB, where the
difference of SA from SB is denoted as  A, and the difference of SB from SA is denoted
as  B, with lengths of  A and  B being indicated as mA and mB, respectively, the set
reconciliation protocol is explained as follows:
1. Host A and Host B create characteristic polynomials, defined as the univariate poly-
nomial in Equation 2.1, Xs(Z) of their sets S = { x1, x2, ..., xn} on some field Fq,
where q is prime and q >= 2b.
Xs(Z) = (Z   x1)(Z   x2)...(Z   xn) (2.1)
2. Host A evaluates XSA(Z) and Host B evaluates XSB(Z) using the same evaluation
points, where the number of evaluation points ism   mA +mB + 1 .
3. Host B sends its evaluations XSB(Zi) , 1  i < m, to Host A.
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4. Combining the evaluations, XSA (Z)XSB (Z) is computed at each evaluation point by Host B.
5. The results of the previous step are interpolated in order to recover the coefficients
of the reduced rational function, defined as the rational function after simplifying
the common factors of the numerator and denominator, X A (Z)X B (Z) .
6. Factorization of X A and X B reveals the elements of  A and  B.
Considering that q = 97, mA = mB = 1, and Host A and Host B have the follow-
ing sets SA = {3, 4, 5, 6} and SB = {3, 4, 5, 7}, respectively, m is calculated as 3, as
explained in Equation 2.2. Thus, the evaluation points Z will include 3 points. Letting
Z = { 1, 2, 3}, the characteristic polynomials of Host A and Host B are created as in
Equation 2.3. Polynomial evaluations and their division can be seen in Table 2.1. After
recovering the reduced rational function
X SA
(Z)
X SB
(Z) , the roots can be obtained as 6 and 7,
since the different set elements of SA and SB are less than 2.
m   mA +mB + 1,mA = 1,mB = 1 (2.2)
XSA(Z)(Z   3)(Z   4)(Z   5)(Z   6)
XSB(Z) = (Z   3)(Z   4)(Z   5)(Z   7)
(2.3)
Z = -1 -2 -3
XSA(Z) 64 31 17
XSB(Z) 87 47 62
XSA(Z)/XSB(Z) 13 44 30
Table 2.1: Polynomial Evaluations For the Example Above
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2.5 HMAC
HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) is a mechanism that provides
message authentication utilizing cryptographic hash functions [19]. While HMAC can
be applied using any cryptographic hash function, the strength of it highly depends on the
security of the underlying hash function. Since SHA-256 is considered as a secure hash
function to the date of writing this thesis, it can be used as the underlying hash function
for HMAC. In addition to the hash function, HMAC also uses a secret key, whose length
can be anything up to the data block size B, in the calculations. Considering a message
M , a hash function H , a secret key K, and two fixed and different strings ipad and opad,
where ipad is equal to the B times of byte 0x36 and opad is equal to the B times of byte
0x5C. For calculating HMAC ofM in Equation 2.4, the following steps are needed:
1. Zeros is appended toK until the size ofK becomes equal to the block size of B, if
the size of K is smaller than the block size B.
2. XOR operation is performed between the B-byte result of Step-1 and ipad.
3. M is appended to the XOR result from Step-2.
4. H is applied to the result of Step-3.
5. XOR operation is performed between the B-byte result of Step-1 and opad.
6. The result of Step-5 and the result of Step-4 is concatenated.
7. H is applied of the result of Step-6.
HMAC(M) = H(K   opadkH(K   ipadkM)) (2.4)
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2.6 Bio-Cryptography in BAN Security
Bio-cryptography [42] is the combination of biometrics and traditional cryptosystems,
where the former contains methods that investigate the human characteristics [29], while
the latter involves methods to provide authentication by a secret key. Biometric keys
are superior than pure cryptographic keys since they cannot be forgotten, lost or stolen.
Hence, bio-cryptography can be applied on biosensors in order to provide the security of
the communication among them.
The communication security between the biosensors can be supplied by fuzzy cryp-
tography, which means that the generated keys on the biosensors do not need to be identi-
cal but should be similar with a tolerable threshold [15]. Fuzzy cryptography can be also
divided into fuzzy based key binding and key generation. Both in key binding and key
generation algorithms, physiological signals are utilized to produce pseudo random num-
bers. However, the difference between the key generation and key binding algorithms is
that the former generates the cryptographic keys directly from the pseudo random num-
bers obtained from the physiological signals [44, 17, 40, 26], while the latter use those
pseudo random numbers in order to conceal the cryptographic key generated from the
traditional cryptographic algorithms [9, 3, 7, 45]. As the main focus of this thesis is the
key generation algorithms, examples from them are discussed in the rest of this section.
Using physiological signals for BAN security was first introduced by Venkatasubra-
manian in [9]. Also, it has been demonstrated that physiological signals could be suitable
sources for cryptographic key generation in the previous works [16, 31]. The authors
in [4] used inter-pulse interval interval (IPI) for the first time as a biometric characteristic
in order to identify an individual. On the other hand, the requirements of a cryptographic
key is explained in [31]. One of the most important characteristics of a cryptographic key
is being random. Ortiz-Martin et al. [28] claims that the IPIs obtained from the physio-
logical signals do not possess sufficient randomness. In order to increase the randomness
of the generated keys, Rostami et al. [35] suggest to extract the 4 least significant bits
from the quantized IPI values. However, the mean and the standard deviation of the IPI
values generated from the physiological signals of each individual vary. For this reason,
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extracting fixed amount of bits may decrease the randomness of the generated keys and a
dynamic method is needed to determine the bit length retrieved in each IPI value.
Seepers et al. [37] propose a key-exchange protocol that aims to circumvent heartbeat
mis-detection by removing IPI values in a block of IPIs, that are far from the mean of the
block. Chen [8] studies electroencephalogram (EEG) signals and introduces a transfor-
mation method that increases the randomness of the generated binary sequence. In Chen’s
method, the least significant five bits of the EEG sample amplitude are summed up, the
modulo 2 is applied to the sum to obtain one or zero as a result. Bao et al. [2] propose a key
generation method for BAN. In this method, they first accumulatem IPI values, and then
modulo operation (mod(2p)) is applied on the accumulation result. Finally, the modulo
result is mapped to a smaller range f : [0, 2p) ! [0, 2q) using the Equation 2.5. Seepers
et al. [36] propose using Von Neumann extractor to increase randomness in physiological
key generation. In this method, Von Neumann extractor, a function that produces output
bit xout = x0 if and only if two consequtive input bits x0 and x1 is not equal to each other,
otherwise x0 and x1 are discarded, is applied on the most significant bits of the IPIs.
f(m) =
m
2p q
(2.5)
Moosavi [26] proposes a key generation approach that combines several features of
ECG signals as the source of the generated cryptographic key, named as SEF (several
ECG features)-based cryptographic key generation. The authors assert that the execution
time of SEF is faster than the IPI-based cryptographic key generation protocols. SEF
includes a dynamic approach for deciding the number of bits to extract from each ECG
feature. For this purpose, the mean (m) and the standard deviation (std) of the feature set
are calculated. Then, coefficient of variation (Cv), as seen in Equation 2.6, is obtained.
Finally, the number of bits (M ) to extract from each feature is decided using the Equa-
tion 2.7. Thus, x-bit binary value is generated using the aforementioned method. Finally,
the generated bit sequence is strengthened using Fibonacci linear feedback shift register
and advanced encryption standard algorithms.
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Cv = m/std (2.6)
M =
ln(std)
ln(2)
+ Cv (2.7)
The authors of SEF assert that the range of each ECG feature differs and also the
ranges are not the same in different datasets. Therefore, they apply a dynamic technique
in order to determine the bit length that can be extracted from each feature. However,
the mean and the standard deviation of the physiological features do not only differ in
different datasets but also differ in each individual’s data. For this reason, dynamic bit
extraction should be applied in each data separately. Also, the authors suggest to retrieve
approximately 16 binary values from one heartbeat cycle. For instance: 2 bits from PR,
4 bits from RR, 4 bits from PP, 4 bits from QT and 2 bits from ST interval is retrieved
in Motion Artifact ECG dataset. However, the paper does not include any analysis that
the obtained bits from different features of ECG signal do not repeat themselves. They
only admit that the NIST Test Suite [5] results are better after key strengthening is being
applied on the extracted bit sequence from the ECG feature.
Venkatasubramanian et al. [44] propose a key generation algorithm (EKA: ECG-based
Key Agreement) that enables two biosensors to create the same cryptographic key utiliz-
ing ECG signals. EKA scheme includes two phases: (i) feature generation, and (ii) key
agreement. The steps of feature generation method of EKA is given in Figure 2.4. For
feature generation, frequency-domain analysis of ECG signal is performed by sampling
the ECG signals in both biosensors simultaneously at 125 Hz for 5minutes. After remov-
ing the noise from the measurements, the total of 625 samples divided into 5 parts of 125
samples each. Then, a 128 point Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) is applied on each parts.
After, a feature vector is constructed using the first 64 FFT coefficients of each part, thus
a total of 320 coefficients are obtained.
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Feature Vector (F)
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FFT FFT FFT FFT
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Figure 2.4: Feature Generation Method of EKA [44]
After generating the feature vector F , in order to generate the binary key from F , a
quantization method is applied. Vector F , which has 320 coefficients in it, is divided into
20 blocks, each containing 16 coefficients. Then, using exponential quantization function,
4 bit value from each coefficient is obtained. As a result of the quantization method, 20
blocks of 64 bit values are produced.
After the feature generation is completed on both biosensors, the resulting blocks are
exchanged between them. The key agreement method of EKA includes three phases:
(i) commitment phase, (ii) processing phase, and (iii) de-commitment phase. In the com-
mitment phase, each block is hashed (using SHA-256) in order not to reveal the key and
then the hashed blocks are transmitted to the other biosensor. The transmitted message
(M ) includes node ids (ID), nonce (N ), hashes of the blocks (total 20 blocks), and also
a MAC and a random key KR to detect adversaries. Equation 2.8 gives the message
transmitted from A to B, and Equation 2.9 gives the message transmitted from B to A.
MA = IDAkNAkhash(bA1 ), hash(bA2 ), ..., hash(bA20)
kMAC(KeyARkIDAkNAkhash(bA1 ), hash(bA2 ), ..., hash(bA20))
(2.8)
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MB = IDBkNBkhash(bB1 ), hash(bB2 ), ..., hash(bB20)
kMAC(KeyBRkIDBkNBkhash(bB1 ), hash(bB2 ), ..., hash(bB20))
(2.9)
In the processing phase of key agreement, a new matrix W is computed on both
biosensors that includes the hamming distances of hashed blocks. Then, this matrix is
used to determine the block indices that include the same values on both biosensors. Af-
ter that, these blocks are hashed in order to create the symmetric keys (KeyA, KeyB) on
the biosensors. In the final phase (de-commitment) of EKA, the legitimacy of the blocks
are checked by exchanging message G. Equation 2.10 represents the message sent from
biosensor A to B, and Equation 2.11 represents the message sent from biosensor B to A.
GA = KeyAR   KeyAkMACA(KeyAkGA) (2.10)
GB = KeyBR   KeyBkMACB(KeyBkGB) (2.11)
Since KeyA = KeyB, each biosensor uses their generated keys for the verification of
message G. If the verification is successful, they perform an XOR operation using their
generated keys to retrieve the KeyR. Finally, KeyR is used to verify the message (M ),
which was received in the commitment phase. If the second verification is successful, a
temporary keyKtemp is created from the generated keys and a random number l as seen in
Equation 2.12. Ktemp is used for the communication between the biosensors.
Ktemp = hash(KeyA, l) = hash(KeyB, l) (2.12)
Exchanged hashes in the commitment phase of EKA is only 64 bit long and can easily
be broken by a brute force attack. Therefore, the authors of EKA suggest key strength-
ening, e.g. hashing the blocks 2n times before exchanging. However, key strengthening
increases the computational cost severely as the authors already have noticed.
On the other hand, Shi et al. [40] suggest an energy efficient key agreement proto-
col, BodyKey, for biosensors. BodyKey utilizes set reconciliation in order to overcome
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the variations of biometrics measured by different biosensors placed on the same individ-
ual. The purpose of BodyKey is to reduce the energy consumption by exchanging only
the necessary information for creating a symmetric key between the biosensors. System
model of BodyKey consists of a group of wireless biomedical sensors; one of them has
a rechargeable battery and stronger computational power and it acts as a control sensor.
The control sensor is responsible for collecting the information from the other sensors and
sending it to an external server. BodyKey consists of three steps: (i) feature extraction,
(ii) key encoding, and (iii) key decoding.
In the feature extraction step, each biosensor measures the same physiological sig-
nals and extracts the biometric features from them. In the key encoding step, the control
biosensor creates a symmetric key K from its biometric features X and sends public
reconciliation information (PRI) to the other biosensors in BAN. For this purpose, the
control sensor generates m original pairs using the ordered set of biometric features as
X = {(1, X1), (2, X2) , ..., (m,Xm)}. Then, it computes s integers via Lagrange Inter-
polation [38], as given in Equation 2.13, where s = 2(m   t) < m, t is the threshold,
|X \ Y   t|, and X \ Y is the number of the elements in the intersection of X and Y .
Then, PRI, as given in Equation 2.14, is constructed using those s integers with a public
positive integer   and a c value as the hashed value of X +  , X is the concatenation of
m elements. After broadcasting PRI to the other biosensors, the control sensor creates the
cryptographic key (K) by utilizing another hash function.
f(Z) =
mX
i=1
(
mY
j=1,j 6=i
Z   j
i  j xi) (2.13)
PRI = {f(m+ 1), f(m+ 2), ..., f(m+ s), , c} (2.14)
In the final step, i.e. key decoding, the destination biosensors generate their feature
vectors (Y ) from their physiological signals. Then, if their feature vectors (Y ) are close
enough to X , X can be regenerated from their feature vectors Y and the received PRI
applying Reed Solomon decoding [24]. For this purpose, the destination sensors combine
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theirm points with the received s pairs to obtain a group of s+m points. Utilizing Reed
Solomon decoding, a polynomial F of degree m such that at least s + t pairs lied on the
polynomial is searched. If there is no such polynomial, then the protocol terminates. If F
is found, then the verification is performed by constructing hashed value of c0. If verifica-
tion is successful, then the sameK generated by the control sensor can be constructed by
the following hash function H(F +  ).
For the performance evaluation of BodyKey, 290 subjects are retrieved from Phys-
ioBank Database [20]. The authors report that BodyKey consumes low energy. However,
the evaluations do not include any randomness tests.
Karaog˘lan Altop et al. [17] suggest SKA-PS (Secure Key Agreement using Physiolog-
ical Signals) protocol. Our proposed SKA-PSAR system is build on the SKA-PS protocol
that produces cryptographic keys using physiological signals of the users, such as blood
pressure (BP), electrocardiogram (ECG) and photoplethysmogram (PPG). IPI values are
utilized in the protocol in order to generate the key between the biosensors that are placed
on the same individual. SKA-PS is based on the set reconciliation paradigm [25] that
enables to reconcile two similar sets on the different sides of a communication. With
the help of set reconciliation, different biosensors on the same individual create the same
cryptographic keys by exchanging polynomial evaluations of their IPI sequences.
Physiological parameter generation technique of the SKA-PS protocol includes (i) peak
detection, (ii) IPI calculation, (iii) quantization, and (iv) binarization steps, as given in
Figure 2.5. In the peak detection step, the peaks of the physiological signals are detected.
Then, the time difference between the consecutive peaks of the signals are extracted in
order to construct the initial IPI sequences. After that, in the IPI calculation step, each
successive g IPI values in the initial IPI sequences are summed up for decreasing the mea-
surement errors of the signals, where g is a system parameter. Afterwards, in the quanti-
zation step, circular uniform quantization with a step size is applied on the resulting IPI
sequences that are generated from the IPI calculation step: After the IPI calculation step,
generated IPI sequences are divided into blocks using a step size s, and each block is
mapped to a value from the set {0, 1, ..., 2128/ lg 1}, where l/g is the length of the IPI se-
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quence. For instance, if IPImin = 1, IPImax = 60, s = 8, and l/g = 64, then the partitions
will be {1  8, 9  15, ..., 53  60}, and the IPI values in the first, fifth, ninth partitions
will be assigned to 0, and second, sixth, tenth partitions will be assigned to 1, and so on.
Finally, in the binarization step, each quantized IPI value is converted into binary using
Gray encoding [23].
Quantization
IPI Calculation
Binarization
Peak Detection
Figure 2.5: Physiological Parameter Generation Technique of SKA-PS
The general methodology of SKA-PS employs two biosensors: source biosensor and
conforming biosensor. Source biosensor sends the polynomial evaluations of its char-
acteristic polynomials that are generated using IPI values, to the conforming biosensor.
Then, conforming biosensor regenerates the source biosensor’s quantized IPI sequence
using its own polynomial evaluations together with the polynomial evaluations received
from the source biosensor. SKA-PS protocol runs in a round manner and in each round,
the source biosensor sends its polynomial evaluations to the conforming biosensor. Con-
forming biosensor applies set reconciliation in order to reconcile the same set of quantized
IPI values of the source biosensor. If the set reconciliation is successful for required num-
ber of sets, the key is generated and the conforming biosensor sends a positive acknowl-
edgment together with the key index of the matching sets; otherwise, it sends a negative
acknowledgement message to the source biosensor.
The performance of the SKA-PS protocol is evaluated through the match rates (i.e.,
True Match Rate, False Match Rate and Half Total Error Rate), randomness, distinctive-
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ness and temporal variance of the generated cryptographic keys, together with computa-
tional and communication complexity, and memory requirements. The authors of SKA-
PS report promising performance results; however, their randomness tests rely only on
Shannon’s entropy [39] and it does not provide good randomness in NIST Test Suite [5].
Moreover, sending the key index in positive acknowledgment causes information leak in
SKA-PS. The intruder might use this index information in his/her brute-force attacks.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Key Agreement System:
Secure Key Agreement using
Physiological Signals with Augmented
Randomness (SKA-PSAR)
In this chapter, we present our proposed Secure Key Agreement using Physiological
Signals with Augmented Randomness (SKA-PSAR) system which is used for creating a
highly random cryptographic key between two biosensors: source biosensor and conform-
ing biosensor. Our proposed SKA-PSAR system is build on the SKA-PS protocol [17]
and it aims to enhance the randomness of the cryptographic keys generated by it. The dif-
ferences and similarities between SKA-PSAR and SKA-PS will be explained in Section 5
in detail.
SKA-PSAR system consists of three main parts: (i) IPI (Inter-Pulse Interval) Se-
quence Generation Technique, (ii) Secure IPI Sequence Reconciliation (SISR) protocol
and (iii) Secure Key Agreement (SKA) protocol. Firstly, IPI Sequence Generation Tech-
nique, explained in Section 3.1, is used to produce the IPI sequences from the physio-
logical signals and the generated IPI sequences will be the input of the SISR protocol.
Secondly, SISR protocol is described in Section 3.2. In SISR protocol, source biosensor
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provides the IPI sequences which will be the source of the cryptographic key. Then, con-
forming biosensor attempts to regenerate the source biosensor’s IPI values by applying the
set reconciliation paradigm, which is explained in Section 2.4. Finally, SKA protocol is
explained in Section 3.3. In SKA protocol, our novel quantization and novel binarization
methods are applied on the reconciled IPI sequence that is generated as the result of the
SISR protocol. As a result of the SKA protocol, source biosensor and conforming biosen-
sor agree on the same cryptographic key. Table 3.1 is provided for the descriptions of
the symbols from our proposed SKA-PSAR system and the overview of the SKA-PSAR
system is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Table 3.1: Symbols used in SKA-PSAR system
Symbol Description
l Length of the initial IPI Sequence
g Size of the IPI groups
PP Reconciled IPI Sequence
CP Characteristic polynomial (from set reconciliation)
PE Polynomial evaluations (from set reconciliation)
E Evaluation points (from set reconciliation)
DE Divided evaluations (from set reconciliation)
n Total number of sets utilized for secure key generation
s Number of elements in each set
r Required number of sets for secure key generation
u Number of utilized sets in a specific round
d Maximum number of different set elements tolerable in set reconciliation
m Maximum number of different set elements tolerable by SKA-PSAR system
minBits Minimum number of bits needed to represent an IPI
b Binarization bit length selected in binarization step
bcg Base Gray code value used in binarization step
K Generated cryptographic key
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IPI Sequence
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Key
Figure 3.1: Overview of SKA-PSAR System
3.1 Proposed IPI Sequence Generation Technique
Our IPI Sequence Generation Technique, which is adopted from the SKA-PS proto-
col [17], is illustrated in Figure 3.2 and defined in Algorithm 1. Our IPI Sequence Gener-
ation Technique includes peak detection, IPI calculation and IPI accumulation steps. This
technique can be used on any cardiovascular physiological signal that is proved to be used
as a cryptographic key [18].
First of all, the peaks of the physiological signals that are measured within the same
time interval on both biosensors are determined. Then, the duration between the consec-
utive peaks are calculated on both biosensors. As a result of this calculation, l IPIs are
obtained. Then, each successive g IPIs are grouped together and summed up to decrease
the measurement errors. After the accumulation operation, l/g IPIs are retrieved from the
initial IPI sequence. This final IPI sequence, PP, is used as the input for the proposed
SISR protocol, which is explained in detail in Section 3.2.
For example, let our measured IPI sequence be {221, 219, 219, 218, 218, 217, 220, 220,
220, 220, 217, 218, 230, 224, 226, 220}; assuming g = 2, final IPI sequence after grouping
will be {440, 437, 435, 440, 440, 435, 454, 446}.
Peak
Detection
IPI
Calculation
IPI
Sequence
Physiological
Signal
IPI
Accumulation
Figure 3.2: IPI Sequence Generation Technique
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Algorithm 1 Proposed IPI Sequence Generation Technique
1: procedure GENERATEIPISEQUENCE(signal, g)
2: ipiInitial, ipiGrouped = []
3: peaks = findPeaks(signal)
4: for i = 0 to len(peaks)  1 do
5: ipiInitial.append(peaks[i+ 1]  peaks[i]) . time difference is calculated
6: end for
7: for i = 0 to len(peaks)/g   1 do
8: groupTotal = 0
9: for k = 0 to g   1 do
10: groupTotal+ = IPI[(i ⇤ g) + k]
11: end for
12: ipiGrouped.append(groupTotal)
13: end for
14: return ipiGrouped
15: end procedure
3.2 Secure IPI Sequence Reconciliation (SISR) Protocol
In this section, we describe our proposed SISR (Secure IPI Sequence Reconciliation)
protocol in detail. SISR utilizes set reconciliation paradigm [25], which is decribed in
Section 2.4. The input of our proposed SISR protocol is the IPI sequences calculated as
the result of our IPI Sequence Generation Technique, which is described in Section 3.1.
Any cardiovascular signal that is proved to be used as a cryptographic key can be used
as an input to SISR protocol, as also discussed in Section 3.1. In our experiments, we
have utilized BP (Blood Pressure) and ECG (Electrocardiogram) signals for the source
and conforming biosensors, respectively, as described in detail in Section 4.
The ultimate purpose of our proposed SISR protocol is to generate a reconciled IPI
sequence on the communicating biosensors, using the resulting IPI sequence of our pro-
posed IPI Sequence Generation Technique. In brief, the source biosensor shares the poly-
nomial evaluations (PEs) of its IPI sequence (PPs) with the conforming biosensor, and
with set reconciliation, the conforming biosensor regenerates the source biosensor’s IPI
sequence (PPs) using its own IPI sequence (PPc). The source and conforming biosensors
communicate with each other on the wireless medium during the SISR protocol. Consid-
ering the security issues on wireless environment, IPI sequences (PP) can not be shared
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directly. Therefore, instead of PP, polynomial evaluations (PE) are transferred over the
wireless medium to protect the sensitive information from being stolen.
First of all, before the SISR protocol starts, both of the biosensors divide their PPs to
create n groups of each with s elements. The reason behind this grouping is the security
concerns of the generated key. To clarify, as further discussed below, after finding the
PP values that will be used to create the key on both of the communicating sides, the
IPI values should be placed in the same order to get exactly the same sequence of IPI
values at both parties at the very end. However, sorting the entire IPI values decreases the
randomness and makes the key weak against brute force attacks. Therefore, IPIs are sorted
only in their groups. Besides, biosensors need to agree on r sets for creating the reconciled
IPI sequence. The value of r should be selected so as to fulfill the needs of the security
level. Using greater r provides better security on the resulting key of the SKA-PSAR
system, but less correct key generation rate between biosensors. More information about
the selection criteria of the SKA-PSAR system parameters can be found in Section 4.2.
Our proposed SISR protocol runs in a round manner. One round of SISR is illustrated
in Figure 3.3 and the steps of SISR are given in Figure 3.4. In each round, all combinations
of r sets from u sets are utilized eliminating the combinations from the previous round,
starting from u = r, until u = n, where r is the required set count and n is the maximum
set count. To clarify, the index of the sets in the first round will be chosen as
 
r
r
 
, which
indicates the first r sets of the PP of the biosensors. In the second round, the indices used
in the previous round will be removed and the remaining indices will be used,
 
r+1
r
   rr ,
and in the last round,
 
n
r
   n 1r   combinations are employed. The process will end when
the reconciled IPI sequence is successfully generated or when the total number of sets (n)
is reached. The latter case means a protocol failure and reconciled IPI sequence is not
generated. As an action to this failure, the subject can try another set of source IPI values,
which means running the protocol from scratch with new input.
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Figure 3.3: One Round of our proposed SISR Protocol
One Round of SISR Protocol
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Reconciled IPI Sequence Failed
Proceed to SKA Protocol
u = u+ 1
u = r
Start SISR Protocol
Figure 3.4: Our Proposed SISR Protocol
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In each round of our proposed SISR protocol, the source biosensor generates the com-
binations of r sets from u sets, creates the characteristic polynomials (CPs) of each set
and calculates the polynomial evaluations (PEs) using the public evaluation points (E).
After that, the source biosensor sends its polynomial evaluations of the chosen r sets to
the conforming biosensor. Source sensor operations can be seen in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Source Sensor Operations
1: procedure RUNPROTOCOL(PPS, r, n, E)
2: foundKey = false
3: u = r
4: while foundKey = false and u <= n do
5: allIndices = selectIndices(u)
6: for each indices 2 allIndices do
7: CPS = createCP(PPS, indices)
8: PES = findPE(CPS, E)
9: send(PES)
10: foundKey = receive()
11: if foundKey = true then
12: return u
13: end if
14: end for
15: u+ = 1
16: end while
17: return failed
18: end procedure
On the other hand, after receiving the polynomial evaluations of the source biosen-
sor (PEs) in a particular round, the conforming biosensor calculates the combinations of
sets,
 
u
r
    u 1r  , that will be used in the current round. Then, the conforming biosensor
creates the characteristic polynomials (CPc) of these sets and calculates its own polyno-
mial evaluations (PEc) using the public evaluation points (E). After that, the conforming
biosensor divides PEs to PEc to obtain their divided evaluations (DE) which is equal to
CPs
CPc
. Then, these values will be interpolated to calculate the coefficients of the reduced
rational function, X A (Z)X B (Z) . Finally, solving the equation of
X A (Z)
X B (Z)
reveals the roots that
include the different set elements of the source and conforming biosensors. Using the
set reconciliation paradigm explained in Section 2.4, the conforming biosensor is able to
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regenerate the exact same sets of IPI values of the source bionsensor (PPs) if and only if
CPs and CPc differ in d elements with each other. More detailed explanations about the
selection criteria of parameter d can be seen in Section 4.2 and the conforming biosensor
operations can be seen in Algorithm 3.
In the first try of a round, the conforming biosensor applies set reconciliation on orig-
inal PPc and PPs. If set reconciliation is successful, PPc sequence will be saved and
the SISR protocol will continue using the other sets. Contrarily, if the set reconciliation
protocol is unsuccessful, a margin parameter (m) is used by the conforming biosensor.
A new set will be generated from the original PPc, where one of the IPI values in the
original set will increase or decrease by margin. Here, ±m is applied on each element of
the currently processed set (PPc), PPc[i], where 0  i < s. The necessity of parameterm
is further explained in Section 4.1.
For each set, s ⇤ 2 additional sets from the original set are obtained by this method,
which has the advantage of increasing the true match possibilities of the key agreement
between the source and conforming biosensors, but with the disadvantage of additional
computational complexity that increases the key agreement latency. Considering that the
conforming biosensor has a set of IPI sequences as seen in Equation 3.1, the new sets will
be as given in Equation 3.2, for the first try.
PPc = {443, 437, 435, 442} (3.1)
PP 0c[0] = {442, 437, 435, 442}
PP 00c [0] = {444, 437, 435, 442}
(3.2)
In such a case, set reconciliation will be applied between the generated sets PP0c,
PP00c and PPs. If set reconciliation is not successful again, using both PP
0
c and PP
00
c , the
next element (PPc[i]) of the currently processed set (PPc) will have an additional value
of ±margin and the conforming biosensor will try to reconcile PPs again with the newly
generated sets, which are provided in Equation 3.3.
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PP 0c[1] = {443, 436, 435, 442}
PP 00c [1] = {443, 438, 435, 442}
(3.3)
For each modification, only one element of the current set changes; the others remain
as original. This operation will continue until the margin is applied on all the IPI values in
the set or the set reconciliation is successful. As a result of the modifications, s ⇤ 2 more
alternative PPc values are obtained.
In particular, having PPs = {440, 437, 435, 442} and PPc = {443, 437, 435, 442},
as the IPI sequences of the source and conforming biosensors, respectively, characteristic
polynomials of the source and conforming biosensors over the field F997 will be calculated
as given in Equation 3.4, respectively, considering the bound of evaluation points as m,
wherem satisfies the condition given in Equation 3.5. With such values, if the source and
conforming biosensors use E = { 1, 2, 3} and when the characteristic polynomials
are evaluated at the evaluation points over F997, the polynomial evaluations will be as
given in the Equation 3.6.
CPs(x) = (x  440)(x  437)(x  435)(x  442)
CPc(x) = (x  443)(x  437)(x  435)(x  442)
(3.4)
m   ms +mc + 1 (3.5)
PEs = {410, 337, 725}
PEc = {562, 125, 93}
(3.6)
At this point, PEs will be transmitted to the conforming biosensor and the division
of the evaluations will be calculated by the conforming biosensor using Equation 3.7, as
DE = PEsPEc = {870, 234, 115}.
PEs
PEc
=
CP s(x)
CP c(x)
(3.7)
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Algorithm 3 Conforming Sensor Operations
1: procedure CONFORMINGPROTOCOLRUN(PPC , r, n,m,E)
2: foundSetCount = 0
3: resultIPI, solution = []
4: sourceTerminate = false
5: keyFound = false
6: while foundSetCount < r and keyFound = false do
7: PES, indices, sourceTerminate = receive()
8: if sourceTerminate = true then
9: break
10: end if
11: for each i 2 indices do
12: for each ipi 2 PPC [i] do
13: currentSet = PPC [i]
14: for each action 2 [noChange,increase,decrease] do
15: newIPI = action(ipi,m)
16: currentSet.replace(ipi,newIPI)
17: CPC = createCP(currentSet)
18: PEC = findPE(CPC , E)
19: DE = findDE(PEC ,PES)
20: roots = solveEquation(DE, E)
21: if roots! = [] then
22: foundSetCount+ = 1
23: resultIPI.append(currentSet)
24: solution.append(roots)
25: break
26: end if
27: end for
28: if roots! = [] then
29: break
30: end if
31: end for
32: if foundSetCount >= r then
33: keyFound = True
34: send(ACK) . Key is found
35: break
36: else
37: send(NAK) . Key is not found
38: end if
39: end for
40: end while
41: end procedure
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As explained in the original set reconciliation algorithm [25], the coefficients of the
reduced rational function CP s (x)CP c (x) can be recovered by interpolating theDE values. Finally,
by factoring CP s(x) and CP c(x), the different elements of the sets are recovered as the
roots: 440 and 443. More information about set reconciliation can be found in Section 2.4.
3.3 Secure Key Agreement (SKA) Protocol
At the end of the SISR protocol, which is explained in Section 3.2, the conforming
biosensor finds the reconciled IPI sequence. The purpose of the Secure Key Agreement
(SKA) protocol is to agree on the same cryptographic key that will be used in the com-
munication between the source and the conforming biosensors by using this reconciled
IPI sequence. In order to generate the cryptographic key, we employ novel quantization
and binarization methods on the reconciled IPI sequence. Figure 3.5 illustrates the steps
of our proposed SKA protocol.
Key
AgreementBinarization
Cryptographic
Key
Reconciled
IPI Sequence
Quantization
Figure 3.5: Our Proposed SKA Protocol
In our quantization method, each IPI sequence of a subject is quantized using its own
IPI range. To do so, for each subject i, minimum IPI imin and maximum IPI
i
max values are
found. For each subject, IPI imin is mapped to zero, IPI
i
max is mapped to (IPI
i
max   IPI imin)
and other IPI i values are mapped to linearly within the range [0, (IPI imax   IPI imin)] using
Equation 3.8.
IPI ij = IPI
i
j   IPI imin (3.8)
The purpose of quantizing the IPI values is to reduce the number of bits required for
each IPI while representing them in binary. For instance, in the IPI sequence {440, 437, 435,
440, 440, 435, 454, 446}, with min = 435 and max = 454, min IPI value will be mapped
to 0, max IPI value will be mapped to 454   435 = 19, and the other values will be
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mapped to (IPI i   IPImin). Thus, the quantized IPI sequence after this step will be
{5, 2, 0, 5, 5, 0, 19, 11}.
The next step of SKA after quantization is binarization. Binarization step is of great
importance due to the fact that the randomness of the generated cryptographic key de-
pends heavily on the binary representation of the IPI sequences. Considering the charac-
teristics of cryptographic keys, we select the number of bits to represent each IPI dynam-
ically. Each IPI sequence includes repetitive IPI values that would potentially reduce the
randomness of the generated keys. Therefore, an effective binarization method is needed
to circumvent repetitive bits in the generated cryptographic key.
The first step of our binarization method is finding the minimum number of bits to
represent each IPI in the IPI sequence, which is called minBits. Firstly, minBits of each
IPI value is calculated. Secondly, bit length, using which the maximum number of IPI
values can be calculated in the first step, is chosen as the binarization bit length (b). In
case of an equality, the smallest bit length is chosen as b. If IPI imax is small enough to be
represented using b bits, all of the IPI values in the respective sequence can be represented
using the same bit length value. Otherwise, if some of the IPI values require more bits
to be represented in binary, then those will be represented using the minimum number of
bits needed to represent them.
For example, consider the following quantized IPI sequence {5, 2, 0, 5, 5, 0, 19, 11}.
The IPI value 0 can be represented using a minimum of one bit, the IPI value 2 can be rep-
resented using a minimum of two bits, the IPI value 5 can be represented using a minimum
of three bits, etc. Therefore, a set of minBits values are calculated as {1 : 2, 2 : 1, 3 : 3,
4 : 1, 5 : 1} where the first value of each element is the bit length and the second value is
the number of IPI values that can be represented using this bit length. Here, the counting
shows that two IPI values can be represented using 1 bit, one IPI value can be represented
using 2 bits, three IPI values can be represented using 3 bits, one IPI value can be repre-
sented using 4 bits and one other IPI value can be represented using 5 bits. In our example,
3 will be selected as the binarization bit length (b). However, given the quantized IPI se-
quence {5, 2, 0, 5, 5, 0, 19, 11}, if b is 3, then 11 and 19 cannot be represented using 3 bits
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since the maximum number that can be represented using 3 bits is 7. Therefore, 11 and
19 will be represented using the minimum number of bits to represent them, which are
4 bits and 5 bits, respectively. Table 3.2 demonstrates the relation between the bit length
and the maximum/minimum IPI values that can be represented with that bit length.
Table 3.2: Relation of the bit length and the minimum/maximum IPI values
min max minBits
64 127 7
32 63 6
16 31 5
8 15 4
4 7 3
2 3 2
0 1 1
Gray encoding [23] is a binary representation method that ensures one bit difference
between consecutive values. Table 3.3 shows the 4 bit binary representations of the deci-
mal values between 0  15 with their corresponding gray code values as an example.
Table 3.3: Gray Codes
decimal binary gray
0 0000 0000
1 0001 0001
2 0010 0011
3 0011 0010
4 0100 0110
5 0101 0111
6 0110 0101
7 0111 0100
8 1000 1100
9 1001 1101
10 1010 1111
11 1011 1110
12 1100 1010
13 1101 1011
14 1110 1001
15 1111 1000
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After the necessary bit lengths are calculated for each quantized IPI value, Gray en-
coding [23] is applied for binarization, as given in Algorithm 4. In order to increase the
randomness of the generated cryptographic keys, each quantized IPI value is represented
using a different bit sequence. The purpose of representing the same IPI value using a
different encoding is to increase the randomness by differentiating the repetitive values.
The differentiation of IPI values are produced by concatenating additional bit se-
quences to the base Gray code value (bgc) which is the regular Gray code for the cor-
responding value. Presuming the quantized sequence has the repetitive value of ⌦ in
different indices n times, ⌦1,⌦2...⌦n, the first time that ⌦ has been observed in the se-
quence, i.e. ⌦1, the binary value of ⌦1 will be calculated as bgc⌦. However, the second
time that ⌦ has been observed, i.e. ⌦2, the value of ⌦2 will not be represented by only
using the base gray code value (bgc⌦) of ⌦, but also an additional Gray code value will be
concatenated to bgc⌦. The additional Gray codes will start from 1 bit Gray codes {0, 1},
and continue with 2 bit Gray codes {00, 01, 11, 10}, and so on, until the repetitions of ⌦
remain. In the second repetition of ⌦, i.e. ⌦2, the additional value that will be appended is
the value from the first index of 1 bit Gray codes, ⌦2 = bgc⌦||0, while the third repetition
of ⌦, i.e. ⌦3, will be represented by bgc⌦||1. Similarly, for the fourth and fifth repetitions,
bgc⌦||00 and bgc⌦||01 will be used, respectively. For example, the final binarization re-
sult of the quantized IPI sequence {5, 2, 0, 5, 5, 0, 19, 11} will be the concatenation of the
each IPI’s Gray code values, such as {111, 011, 000, 1110, 1111, 0000, 11010, 1110}.
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Algorithm 4 Binarization Method
1: procedure BINARIZE(reconciledIPISequence)
2: binaryResult =00
3: bitLengths = []
4: for each ipi 2 reconciledIPISequence do
5: if ipi = 0 then
6: bitLengths[0]+ = 1
7: else
8: bitLength = lower (log2(ipi) + 1)
9: bitLengths[bitLength]+ = 1
10: end if
11: end for
12: b = bitLengths.index(max(bitLengths))
13: maxIPItoWrite = 2b   1
14: grayCodes = createGrayCodes(b)
15: additionalGrayCodes = createAdditionalGrayCodes()
16: markedIndex = [0] ⇤ len(reconciledIPISequence)
17: for each ipi 2 reconciledIPISequence do
18: if ipi > maxIPItoWrite then
19: dynamicBitLength = lower (log2(ipi) + 1)
20: dynamicGrayCodes = createDynamicGrayCodes(dynamicBitLength)
21: binaryResult+ = dynamicGrayCodes[ipi]
22: else
23: binaryResult+ = grayCodes[ipi]
24: end if
25: if markedIndex[ipi]! = 0 then
26: binaryResult+ = additionalGrayCodes[markedIndex[ipi]  1]
27: end if
28: markedIndex[ipi]+ = 1
29: end for
30: return binaryResult
31: end procedure
The key agreement step, which is illustrated in Figure 3.6, of our proposed SKA
protocol starts after binarization. In order to generate the cryptographic key (K), quan-
tization and binarization methods are applied on the reconciled IPI sequence. After the
key is generated on the conforming biosensor, the HMAC of the “KeyGenerated” mes-
sage with the conforming and source biosensors’ IDs is sent to the source biosensor using
the generated key. Then, the source biosensor generates all possible key combinations
applying the quantization and binarization methods to its IPI sequences that belong to
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that particular round and creates all combinations of the HMAC of the “KeyGenerated”
message with the conforming and source biosensors’ IDs using the possible key combi-
nations. After that, source biosensor checks which HMAC from the HMAC combinations
is equal to the one received from the conforming biosensor. When the matching HMAC
is found, source biosensor sends the HMAC of the “KeyConfirmed” message with the
source and conforming biosensors’ IDs using the matching key. Finally, source biosensor
and conforming biosensor will start using the generated cryptographic key to secure their
communication.
Source Biosensor Conforming Biosensor
time time
HMAC(K, IDconformingkIDsourcek “KeyGenerated”)
HMAC(K, IDsourcekIDconformingk “KeyConfirmed”)
Checks if the received HMAC
can be re-generated
using one of the possible keys
Figure 3.6: Key Agreement
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Chapter 4
Performance Evaluation
In this chapter, we discuss the performance measurements related to the security, ran-
domness, distinctiveness and temporal variance of the cryptographic keys generated using
our proposed SKA-PSAR (Secure Key Agreement using Physiological Signals with Aug-
mented Randomness) system described in Section 3, together with its key agreement rates,
computational complexity, communication complexity and memory requirements. First
of all, the test environment and the dataset utilized in our experiments are discussed in
Section 4.1. Secondly, the details of the parameters of SKA-PSAR system are explained
in Section 4.2. Then, the key agreement rates are given in Section 4.3. Security analyses
including temporal variance, distinctiveness and detailed randomness analysis of the gen-
erated keys are given in Section 4.4. Finally, computational complexity, communication
complexity and memory requirement of SKA-PSAR system are discussed in Section 4.5.
4.1 Test Environment and Dataset
We implemented our SKA-PSAR system using Python programming language ver-
sion 2.7.13 on MacBook Pro (2.9 GHz Intel Core i5, 8 GB 1867 MHz DDR3, Intel Iris
Graphics 6100 1536 MB and MacOS (High Sierra)) and also on Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B (1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-core ARMv8 CPU, 802.11n Wireless LAN, Bluetooth 4.1, Blue-
tooth Low Energy, 1GB RAM), Raspbian OS (Raspbian GNU/Linux 8).
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For the experiments, we used BP (Blood Pressure) and ECG (Electrocardiogram) sig-
nals obtained from the publicly available PhysioBank MIMIC II Waveform database [20]
as the inputs for the source and conforming biosensors, respectively. The performance
results do not depend on the choice of the physiological signals for each biosensor. The
utilized signals are recorded simultaneously for 5 minutes (sampled at 125 Hz) in order
to obtain data from a total of 30 subjects. Then, each signal is divided into two parts and
each part is used independently from each other to generate two different IPI (inter-pulse
interval) sequences of 80 values each, as explained in Section 3.1. After that, the gener-
ated IPI sequences are used as inputs for the SISR protocol of our proposed SKA-PSAR
system.
Table 4.1 presents statistics of the data retrieved from the PhysioBank MIMIC II
Waveform database [20]. Each row of this table includes the first part of the BP sig-
nal of a subject. The general statistics of IPI distributions are given in Table 4.2. These
statistics show that the average distinct IPIs belonging to a particular subject from our
test data (30 subjects, 2 IPI sequences from each subject, 80 IPI values in each sequence)
is approximately 15, and the average range is approximately 30. The minimum IPI of
all subjects is 249 and the maximum is 697. Even though the difference between the
maximum and the minimum IPI values of all subjects is high, the average IPI range of
a single subject, which is calculated as 30, is low. Considering the low range of the IPI
values in a particular subject, quantization step in the SKA protocol of our SKA-PSAR
system is regulated to obtain acceptable randomness of the resulting cryptographic keys,
as explained in Section 3.1. In order to use our proposed SKA-PSAR system, the range
of the IPI sequence of an individual should be at least 10, since otherwise the system will
be vulnerable to brute-force attacks. The subjects are selected according to this rule.
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Table 4.1: Statistics of IPI Distributions
Subject Range Min Max Number of Distinct IPI
1 38 432 470 11
2 18 420 438 13
3 26 352 378 16
4 10 249 259 11
5 11 355 366 11
6 10 540 550 11
7 33 472 505 10
8 95 356 451 18
9 16 308 324 14
10 37 349 386 21
11 24 392 416 18
12 29 484 513 17
13 20 444 464 15
14 33 482 515 13
15 82 400 482 17
16 12 404 416 12
17 37 470 507 18
18 28 251 279 16
19 25 506 531 19
20 97 600 697 25
21 34 419 453 23
22 33 551 584 20
23 14 460 474 12
24 36 415 451 14
25 21 469 490 19
26 27 361 388 15
27 31 415 446 20
28 70 432 502 15
29 25 548 573 20
30 17 321 338 14
Table 4.2: General Statistics of IPI Distributions
Average Range Min Max Average Number of Distinct IPI
30 249 697 15
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We analyzed the IPI distributions in order to detect any repetitive IPI values calculated
in the IPI calculation step of the IPI Sequence Generation Technique of our proposed
SKA-PSAR system. We also analyzed the range between the minimum IPI value and
the maximum IPI value obtained from a particular subject. From our observations, we
detected that the generated IPI sequences do have repetitions of the same values. Also,
we argue that these repetitions reduce the randomness of the resulting keys. Figure 4.1,
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 demonstrate the distributions of the calculated IPI values from
the BP signals of Subjects 1, 3 and 8, respectively. For instance, one can see from Fig-
ure 4.1 that IPI sequence of Subject 1 includes the IPI value of “445” 15 times, where
the other IPI values appear only a few times. A similar issue that results in producing
non-random cryptographic keys is also seen in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. In order to
address the problem of the weak randomness of the generated keys, we propose a novel
binarization method in Section 3.3.
Figure 4.1: IPI Distribution of BP signal of Subject 1
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Figure 4.2: IPI Distribution of BP signal of Subject 3
Figure 4.3: IPI Distribution of BP signal of Subject 8
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4.2 System Parameters
Security of a cryptographic key depends on the number of effective bits used in the
generation of the key. Therefore, the longer the key size, the stronger the key obtained
in terms of security. Our proposed SKA-PSAR system produces keys, whose size is
determined by the set size (s), the number of utilized sets (r) and the bit length used for
representing each IPI of the reconciled IPI sequence produced at the end of SISR protocol,
as explained in the binarization step of the SKA protocol of our SKA-PSAR system in
Section 3.1. The key sizes that are obtained from SKA-PSAR system is given in Table 4.3.
The final length of the key is nb and the strength of this key would be 2nb in case of a
regular brute force attack. However, the search space of the attacker is decreased as the
result of sorting each set of IPI values in the SISR protocol of our SKA-PSAR system
explained in Section 3.2.
Table 4.3: Key sizes obtained from SKA-PSAR system
s d m r Minimum Maximum Average
4 1 1
7 108 186 140
8 126 213 162
For calculating the effective key length of the generated cryptographic keys, first, the
search space (ss), defined as the number of possible sets that contain sorted, repetitive s
numbers, where 0   s   v and v denotes the range of the IPI values (i.e., IPI imax  IPI imin)
of an individual, is calculated. The formula for calculating the search space is given
in Equation 4.1, where r is the required set size parameter of the SKA-PSAR system.
Equation 4.2 gives the effective key length of the generated cryptographic keys, where
the average range of IPI values that are used to generate this key is v.
ss =
✓
v  1 + s
s
◆
(4.1)
Effective key length = log2(ss
r) (4.2)
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The value of s is important to prevent information leakage of the IPI values. As
described in Section 3.2, PP sequences are represented using characteristic polynomials
of degree s and evaluated on points E. A polynomial of degree s can be constructed using
s+ 1 linear equations. Thus, the number of exchanged polynomial evaluations should be
at most s in order to hide the IPI values from the attacker. However, using s evaluations, a
polynomial of degree s  1 can be constructed. Therefore, the degree of the interpolated
function to be solved on the conforming biosensor DE = CPsCPc should be at most s  1.
In order to solve this rational function, degree(CPsCPc ) + 1 simultaneous linear equations
are needed. Therefore, degree(CPsCPc )+1 should be equal to s 1; thus s = degree(CPsCPc )+2.
When a set of IPI values of the biosensors differ one element in s elements, i.e. d = 1,
degree(CPsCPc ) will be 2, s will be 4; and thus the number of simultaneous linear equations
are needed to solve DE will be 3. In short, 3 linear equations should be sent from the
source biosensor to the conforming biosensor and hence the number of elements of E
should be 3, when the element size s of a set is 4 and d is 1. In the case when d = 2, s
should be at least 6, which means that 5 simultaneous equations are required. Similarly,
when d = 3, s should be 8 and 7 equations are needed. As a result, the most feasible
parameters are s = 4 and d = 1 for our proposed SISR protocol.
SISR protocol runs using the non-quantized, raw IPI values, a.k.a. IPI sequence,
obtained as a result of our IPI Sequence Generation Technique explained in Section 3.1.
Therefore, in order to obtain high correct key generation rates, the margin parameter (m),
which is clarified in the Section 3.2, is used in our SISR protocol. When s is 4 and
d is 1, m is selected as 1. The reason behind choosing m as 1 is not to increase the
computational complexity of the protocol by creating lots of candidate IPI sequences.
This method enables to increase the maximum number of tolerated different set elements
in the set reconciliation to d+m.
In the light of the information discussed above, we carefully chose s, d, m and r
parameters of our proposed SKA-PSAR system as indicated in Table 4.4, considering the
security requirements of the length of the generated keys.
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Table 4.4: Parameters used our SKA-PSAR system
s d m r
Effective Key
Length (bits)
4 1 1
7 ⇡ 107
8 ⇡ 122
4.3 Correct Key Generation Rate (CKGR) and False Key
Generation Rate (FKGR)
In our evaluations, Correct Key Generation Rate (CKGR) represents the successful
key agreement ratio between the source and the conforming biosensors of the same per-
son. On the other hand, False Key Generation Rate (FKGR) corresponds to the successful
key agreement between the source and the conforming biosensors of different people,
which should not occur due to security reasons.
Table 4.5 shows the relation between the system parameters, i.e. set size (s), number
of different elements tolerable in set reconciliation (d), margin (m), required number of
sets to generate the cryptographic key (r) and total number of sets that can be utilized in
the protocol (n), and the key generation rates.
Table 4.5: Correct Key Generation Rates and False Key Generation Rates of SKA-PSAR system
Parameters Correct Key Generation Rate False Key Generation Rate
s d m r n
4 1 1
7
14 91.6 0
15 93.3 0
16 98.3 0
17 98.3 0
18 98.3 0
19 100 0
8
15 90 0
16 91.6 0
17 95 0
18 98.3 0
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When n increases, CKGR also increases, as expected, since more sets are processed
during the protocol so that the possibilities of finding the matching r sets increases. On
the other hand, FKGR is 0% in all cases, which shows that different subjects’ biosensors
do not establish correct cryptographic keys among themselves. Moreover, less sets needed
to be reconciled when r = 7, compared to the case when r = 8, therefore CKGR is better
when r = 7. Results show that 100% CKGR can be achieved among the biosensors when
r = 7 and n = 19, with 0% FKGR.
Also, there is an inverse proportion between the value of the required sets r and the
CKGR as seen in Table 4.5: when r increases the total number of subjects who can suc-
cessfully generate keys decreases. Contrarily, when r increases the effective key lengths
of the generated keys increase. Therefore, even though the greater r provides better secu-
rity in terms of key strength, value of r should also be selected considering the CKGR of
the overall system.
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the cryptographic keys generated by our proposed SKA-
PSAR system using the security metrics such as randomness, distinctiveness and temporal
variance. In Section 4.4.1, the threat model is explained. In Section 4.4.2, we discuss
the randomness results obtained from the NIST Test Suite [5] and in Section 4.4.3 and
Section 4.4.4, we provide the distinctiveness and the temporal variance of the resulting
cryptographic keys, respectively.
4.4.1 Threat Model
The purpose of the adversary is to obtain the cryptographic key that is agreed between
the source biosensor and the conforming biosensor as a result of the SKA-PSAR system.
Since the communication between the biosensors is on wireless medium, the network
packets including the keying materials might be captured and obtained by the adversary.
However, the exchanged information do not reveal the key itself, since it includes the
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polynomial evaluations that are sent from the source biosensor and the HMAC of the
key with an acknowledgement message that is sent from the conforming biosensor. The
attacker might try to break the HMAC and apply brute force attack in order to find the
matching cryptographic key. Therefore, our proposed SKS-PSAR system parameters are
chosen as to provide an effective key size for the generated cryptographic key as explained
in Section 4.2. Moreover, she/he might attempt to solve the polynomial evaluations that
are sent from the source biosensor to the conforming biosensor, however the SKA-PSAR
system parameters are chosen to circumvent this issue, as explained in Section 4.2.
4.4.2 Randomness of the Generated Cryptographic Keys
Being random is one of the most important characteristics of cryptographic keys. Con-
sidering this in mind, we made necessary regulations on the proposed SKA-PSAR sys-
tem, especially on the quantization and binarization steps of the SKA protocol which is
explained in Section 3.3. Representing each IPI using a different bit sequence is one of
the regulations made in order to obtain more random keys.
For the analysis of randomness, a Python implementation [11] of NIST Test Suite [5]
is utilized, which supplies a command line tool to evaluate the randomness of the gener-
ated keys. NIST Test Suite includes 15 randomness tests and each test is given with the
input size recommendation in the documentation [5]. We selected seven tests, which are
explained below, whose input size is suitable for the cryptographic keys that are gener-
ated by our proposed SKA-PSAR system. For the other eight tests, input sizes were not
sufficient for the output of our proposed system.
In NIST Test Suite [5] documentation, P-value is described as “The probability that
a perfect random number generator would have produced a sequence less random than
the sequence that was tested, given the kind of non-randomness assessed by the test.” P-
value of 1 shows that the binary sequence is a perfect random sequence and P-value of 0
indicates a non-random sequence. In this thesis, P-value is taken as 0.01 as recommended
by NIST Test Suite [5] documentation and the binary sequence is accepted as random if
the result of its test is greater than or equal to this P-value.
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• Frequency (Monobit) Test: The purpose of this test is to determine whether the
number of ones and zeros in the sequence are almost the same. This test is also
used as a prerequisite test to the other tests.
• Frequency Test within a Block: The aim of this test is to examine the proportions
of ones in M bit blocks. The proportion should be approximately M/2 and M is
selected as 20, as recommended by the documentation thatM   20 andM > .01nb
should be satisfied, where the total key size (nb) is the multiplication of the selected
bit length with r ⇤ s in our experiments.
• Runs Test: A run is described as the length k of identical bits (zeros or ones)
bounded by the opposite bit. This test checks if the number of runs of zeros and
ones are expected for a random sequence.
• Test for the Longest Run of Ones in a Block: This test analyses whether the
longest run of ones within M blocks are expected for a random sequence. The
disorder of the longest run of ones implies the disorder of the longest run of zeros.
In this test,M is selected as 8, as recommended by the documentation.
• Non-Overlapping Template Matching Test: The purpose of this test is to count
the occurrences of non-periodic patterns in the given binary sequence.
• Approximate Entropy Test: This test aims to compare the frequency of every
overlappingm-bit patterns against the expected result for a random sequence. Here,
m is selected as 2, as recommended by the documentation that m < log2(n)   5
should be satisfied.
• Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test: The purpose of this test is to check if the cumu-
lative sums of partial sequences are as expected for a random sequence.
The results of the corresponding tests of NIST Test Suite are given in Table 4.6, which
demonstrate that a very high percentage of the generated cryptographic keys possess ad-
equate randomness by successfully passing the tests. The test parameters are selected as
recommended by the documentation of the NIST Test Suite.
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In monobit frequency, runs and longest run tests, the successfully passing percentage
of the generated keys is slightly better when r = 7, compared to r = 8. On the other hand,
the successfully passing percentage of the generated keys is larger when r = 8, compared
to r = 7, in block frequency, non-overlapping template matching and cumulative sums
tests.
Table 4.6: NIST Test Suite Results of SKA-PSAR System
NIST Test r = 7 r = 8
Failed Passed Percentage Failed Passed Percentage
Frequency (Monobit) 3 57 95.0 3 56 94.9
Frequency (Block) 4 56 93.3 3 56 94.9
Runs 1 59 98.3 3 56 94.9
Longest Run 1 59 98.3 2 57 96.6
N.O. Template Matching 1 59 98.3 0 59 100.0
Approximate Entropy 0 60 100.0 0 59 100.0
Cusum 4 56 93.3 3 56 94.9
4.4.3 Distinctiveness of the Generated Cryptographic Keys
One of the other important characteristics of cryptographic keys is that they should
be different for different users at any particular time. Ideally half of the bits in the same
locations of the two bit streams should be different to accept them as distinct. Distinc-
tiveness is calculated using the Hamming Distance metric, by measuring the number of
different bits in the same indices of two cryptographic keys belonging to different people.
The SKA protocol of our proposed SKA-PSAR system produces cryptographic keys in
such a way that each has a different key size, as explained in Section 3.3. Since we need
two bit sequences of the same length for Hamming Distance calculation, we used the first
t bits of each key pair, where t is the minimum bit length of the two keys in question. Our
experiments using Hamming Distance metric show that the cryptographic keys generated
by our proposed SKA-PSAR system, which is described in Chapter 3, possess high dis-
tinctiveness as the average Hamming Distance calculated between the cryptographic keys
are 49.70% and 49.65%, when r = 7 and r = 8, respectively.
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4.4.4 Temporal Variance of the Generated Cryptographic Keys
Another essential characteristic of cryptographic keys is the temporal variance, which
is defined as the distinctiveness of the generated cryptographic keys of the same person at
the different time intervals. Temporal variance is important in order to be able to renew
the cryptographic keys in case of any security problem. In our experiments, we generated
two cryptographic keys from the same person in different time intervals, as explained in
Section 4.1. Then, utilizing the Hamming Distance metric, the average temporal variance
of the generated keys is obtained. The cryptographic keys generated from the SKA pro-
tocol of our SKA-PSAR system which is explained in Section 3.3 have diverse key sizes.
For this reason, as in Section 4.4.3, the Hamming Distance calculation is performed using
pairwise minimum bit lengths of the keys. The measured results are 49.46% and 48.85%,
when r = 7 and r = 8, respectively. These results show that the keys generated by our
SKA-PSAR system, which is explained in Section 3, possess high temporal variance.
4.5 Computational and Communication Complexity and
Memory Requirements of SKA-PSAR
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity, communication complex-
ity and memory requirements of our proposed SKA-PSAR system. These complexities
are directly proportional to the maximum number of candidate IPI sequences generated
by the source biosensor and sent to the conforming biosensor for the set reconciliation
processes in the SISR protocol phase. The maximum number of candidate IPI sequences
generated are discussed in Section 4.5.1. We provide the computational and communica-
tion complexities of our proposed SKA-PSAR system in Section 4.5.2 and Section 4.5.3,
respectively and we give its memory requirements in Section 4.5.4.
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4.5.1 Maximum Number of Candidate IPI Sequences Generated in
SISR Protocol
The maximum number of candidate IPI sequences generated with respect to the sys-
tem parameters, i.e. number of elements in each set (s), maximum number of different
set elements tolerable in set reconciliation (d), the margin (m), required number of sets
(r) and the total number of utilized sets (n), are given in Table 4.7. In each round of our
SISR protocol,
 
u
r
   u 1r   candidate IPI sequences are generated by the source biosensor,
where u starts from r and is incremented by one in each round until u = n. After the poly-
nomial evaluations of the candidate IPI sequences are sent to the conforming biosensor,
the conforming biosensor tries to reconcile the same IPI sequences of the source biosen-
sor by trying each IPI sequence. As a result of this, the conforming biosensor needs to do
at most
 
u
r
    u 1r   comparisons.
Expectedly, the number of candidate IPI sequences increases on both biosensors, as
n or r increases. As will be analyzed in the rest of this section, the number of candi-
date IPI sequences is directly proportional to computational complexity, communication
complexity and memory requirements of the overall SKA-PSAR system.
Table 4.7: Maximum number of candidate IPI sequences generated in SISR protocol
Parameters Number of candidate IPI sequences generated
s d m r n
4 1 1
7
14 3432
15 6435
16 11440
17 19448
18 31824
19 50388
8
15 6435
16 12870
17 24310
18 43758
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4.5.2 Computational Complexity
Computational complexity of our proposed SKA-PSAR system is measured by the
time difference between the start time of the IPI Sequence Generation Technique and the
end time of SKA protocol. Here, the start time is defined as the time that the connection
has been established between two communicating biosensors, while the end time is de-
fined as the time that both biosensors have generated the symmetric cryptographic keys
or the time that the total number of utilized sets (n) are reached. The former scenario
represents a successful key agreement whereas the latter scenario shows a failure case of
the SISR protocol.
Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 present the average latency of SKA-PSAR system obtained
from Macbook Pro and Raspberry Pi3, respectively. Both tables show the relation be-
tween the system parameters (s, d,m, r, n) and the average round time together with the
average total time, both in seconds. However, Table 4.9 has less data due to the fact that
the SKA-PSAR system execution takes too much time on Raspberry Pi3 using the system
parameters that are included in Table 4.8 but not included in Table 4.9. The SISR protocol
of our proposed SKA-PSAR system runs in a round manner, as explained in Section 3.2.
Here, the round time is defined as the time elapsed between the start time of one round
and the end time of that round. For generating a key between two biosensors, the pro-
posed SISR protocol runs at least one round and at most n  r+1 rounds, while the SKA
protocol runs only once at the end.
Expectedly, when maximum utilized set count n increases, both the round time and
the total time increase. The reason behind this is that the number of generated candidate
IPI sequences, which is discussed in Section 4.5.1, increases with the increment of n. In
addition to these, CKGR, which is explained in Section 4.3, is directly proportional with
the value of n. Therefore, computational complexity increases in order to obtain better
CKGR between the biosensors. Furthermore, when r increases, the round time and the
total time also increase. When r = 7 and n = 18, CKGR is 98.3% and the average
round time is 23.49 s; when r = 7 and n = 19, CKGR is 100% and the average round
time is 133.7 s, while when r = 8 and n = 18, CKGR is 98.3% and the average round
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Table 4.8: Average latency on Macbook Pro
Parameters Round Time (s) Total Time (s)
s d m r n
4 1 1
7
14 6.85 20.55
15 8.76 27.22
16 23.49 81.22
17 23.49 81.22
18 23.49 81.22
19 36.96 133.70
8
15 12.87 41.25
16 17.71 58.63
17 41.86 148.37
18 66.81 253.65
Table 4.9: Average latency on Raspberry Pi3
Parameters Round Time (s) Total Time (s)
s d m r n
4 1 1
7
14 59.61 178.85
15 74.13 216.29
8
15 102.9 324.01
16 118.579 358.5
time is 66.81 s on Macbook Pro. The latency of the SKA-PSAR system is higher on the
Raspberry Pi3 comparing to the latency of the system on the Macbook Pro, since their
computational capabilities and the memory capacities differ substantially as explained in
Section 4.1.
4.5.3 Communication Complexity
Communication complexity of our proposed SKA-PSAR system is calculated as the
amount of data (in kilobytes) exchanged over the network between the communicating
biosensors during the SISR protocol and the SKA protocol phases. Table 4.10 presents
the data sent both from the source biosensor to the conforming biosensor, and from the
conforming biosensor to the source biosensor.
The data sent from the source biosensor is greater than the data sent from the conform-
ing biosensor. The reason behind this is that the generation of the candidate IPI sequences
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is performed on the source biosensor and those are sent to the conforming biosensor over
the wireless network. On the other hand, conforming biosensor sends only a simple re-
sponse message.
Communication complexity increases when the number of utilized sets (n) increases.
Since with the increase of n, more candidate IPI sequences are generated and sent over the
network, increase in the communication complexity is expected. Moreover, increment of
the required set size (r) from 7 to 8 triggers generation of more IPI sets in order to obtain
longer cryptographic keys, as discussed in Section 4.2. Therefore, the communication
complexity increases when r increases.
Table 4.10: Average communication complexity (KB)
Parameters Amount of Data (KB)
s d m r n
4 1 1
7
14 49.95
15 66.72
16 153.77
17 153.77
18 153.77
19 282.77
8
15 118.59
16 158.02
17 305.26
18 555.01
4.5.4 Memory Requirements
Memory requirements of our proposed SKA-PSAR system is determined by the amount
of memory (in megabytes) allocated for the processes running on the host machines dur-
ing the IPI Sequence Generation Technique with SISR and SKA protocols. The memory
information is retrieved from Macbook Pro using psutil (Python system and process util-
ities) library [33]. USS (Unique Set Size), which is defined in the psutil documentation
as “USS is the most representative metric for determining how much memory is actually
being used by a process. It represents the amount of memory that would be freed if the
process was terminated right now” [33] is used to determine the memory requirement.
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Table 4.11 presents the memory requirements of the source biosensor and the con-
forming biosensor. With the increase of the utilized set size (n), the memory requirement
of both biosensors slightly increase. However, the conforming biosensor uses more mem-
ory compared to the source biosensor. The reason behind this is that the conforming
biosensor generates the candidate IPI sequences in each round of the SISR protocol as
well as receiving the candidate IPI sequences generated by the source biosensor.
Table 4.11: Average memory requirement (MB)
Parameters Source Biosensor Conforming Biosensor
s d m r n
4 1 1
7
14 12 38
15 12 38
16 12 38
17 12 38
18 12 38
19 13 39
8
15 13 38
16 14 39
17 15 40
18 17 41
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Chapter 5
Discussion On the Comparison of the
SKA-PSAR system and the SKA-PS
protocol
In this chapter, we first discuss the general differences between our proposed SKA-
PSAR system and the baseline SKA-PS protocol [17], in Section 5.1, by comparing the
details of the quantization and binarization methods, the system parameters and the pro-
tocol implementations. Then, we analyze the performance differences of SKA-PSAR
system and SKA-PS protocol in Section 5.2, in terms of key generation rates, random-
ness analysis, distinctiveness and temporal variance results, computational complexity,
communication complexity and memory requirements.
5.1 Disparities between SKA-PSAR and SKA-PS
In this section, we compare our proposed SKA-PSAR protocol which consists of three
main parts: (i) IPI Sequence Generation Technique, (ii) SISR protocol, (iii) SKA Protocol,
with the baseline SKA-PS protocol [17]. IPI Sequence Generation Technique of SKA-
PSAR system has equivalent mechanisms up to the quantization step of Physiological
Parameter Generation Technique in SKA-PS protocol. SISR protocol of SKA-PSAR sys-
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tem corresponds to the set reconciliation part of SKA-PS protocol and SKA Protocol of
SKA-PSAR system corresponds to the parts after the set reconciliation paradigm in SKA-
PS protocol. There are significant differences between SKA-PSAR system and SKA-PS
protocol including but not limited to the quantization and binarizationmethods applied to
generate the cryptographic keys from a sequence of IPI values, the data on which the set
reconciliation is applied and the security mechanism of the acknowledgement messages
exchanged during the key agreement protocol.
One of the most important differences between SKA-PSAR and SKA-PS is in the
quantization and binarization algorithms that is used to generate the cryptographic key
to be used among the biosensors for secure communication. In the quantization step of
SKA-PS, a circular uniform quantization method is used [17, 16] as described in detail
in Section 2.6. In this quantization method, different IPI values are represented using the
same quantization value. Therefore, the randomness of the generated cryptographic keys
decrease. In addition to these, utilizing IPImin and IPImax values in the quantization step
is selected from the overall dataset. However, each individual’s IPI range (IPImax - IPImin)
varies, as explained in Section 4.1. Hence, instead of using the range of the dataset,
IPI values belonging to a particular person should be quantized within each other. On
the other hand, in our proposed quantization method, which is explained in Section 3.1,
each IPI in the IPI sequence of an individual i is mapped to (IPI ik   IPImin), where 0 >
k > len(IPI i) + 1. In other words, step size is chosen as 1 in the range of a particular
subject. The aim of our quantization method is to reduce the bit length of each IPI before
the binarization step. Thus, the randomness of the generated cryptographic key from the
SKA-PSAR system will be increased.
The other significant difference between SKA-PSAR and SKA-PS is in the binariza-
tion method. In the binarization step of SKA-PS, 2128/
l
g bit Gray encoding is applied
on each quantized IPI value. In contrary, binarization step in SKA Protocol of SKA-
PSAR system utilizes unique binarization for each subject dynamically, as explained in
Section 3.3 and as represented in Algorithm 4. Depending on the IPI values in the IPI
sequence, binarization bit length (b) changes for each subject and also utilized bit length
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of each IPI from the same subject might differ than each other. After the representation bit
length is obtained, Gray code is applied on the IPI values. Since the randomness depends
on the binary representation of the generated keys, binary representation of the reconciled
IPI sequence is of great importance. Another difference of SKA-PSAR system and SKA-
PS protocol is in the length of the generated key: Resulting cryptographic key agreed in
SKA-PS is fixed size, 128 bit, while the size of the agreed key in SKA-PSAR dynamically
changes depending on the distribution of the IPI values and the binarization bit length (b)
as explained in detail in Section 4.2.
Moreover, the input of the SKA-PS protocol is the quantized IPI values generated
from the quantization step of the physiological parameter generation method of the SKA-
PS protocol. Contrarily, the input of our proposed SISR protocol is the IPI sequence
including raw IPI values obtained from the physiological signals through IPI Sequence
Generation Technique. These IPI values are used in the SISR protocol of the SKA-PSAR
system without being quantized. While using raw IPI values from a diverse range as the
input of our SISR protocol provides better randomness of the generated keys, it causes
the reduction of CKGR compared to the baseline SKA-PS protocol that uses IPI values
from a small range.
Nevertheless, by adding a new margin parameter (m), the CKGR of our SKA-PSAR
system is improved by increasing the number of different set elements that can be tolerated
in set reconciliation. For instance, if the source biosensor has the following set of IPI
values PPs = {443, 437, 435, 442} and the conforming biosensor has the following set
PPc = {443, 437, 438, 440}, where d = 1, m = 1, the number of tolerable different
elements are d+m = 2 and s = 4, utilizing set reconciliation, the conforming biosensor
will be able to retrieve the PPs using our proposed SISR protocol of the SKA-PSAR
system. On the other hand, SKA-PS protocol is designed to handle the IPI sets that differ
each other by only a single set element when the set size (s) is 4. Therefore, in SKA-PS
protocol the conforming biosensor will not be able to regenerate the IPI sequence of the
source biosensor that was provided in the example above.
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Another important difference between our proposed SKA-PSAR system and SKA-PS
protocol is that the security mechanism of the response messages sent from the conform-
ing biosensor to the source biosensor. In SKA-PS, the response message includes the
acknowledgement about whether the key generation is successful or not and also the key
index that belongs to the processed key in the current round. However, this method allows
the malicious intruder to learn the index of the generated key that might be used in her/his
brute force attacks. On the other hand, SKA-PSAR is designed to hide this information
from the attackers by sending the HMAC of a success message with the generated key.
5.2 Performance Comparison of SKA-PSAR and
SKA-PS
In this section, the performance of our proposed SKA-PSAR system and SKA-PS
protocol are compared. For the comparison, we have re-executed SKA-PS protocol with
the dataset that we have used for the performance evaluation of our proposed SKA-PSAR
system. For the performance analyses, we use the Python programming language (Python
2.7.13) and implemented SKA-PS both on Raspberry Pi 3 Model B (1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-
core ARMv8 CPU, 802.11n Wireless LAN, Bluetooth 4.1, Bluetooth Low Energy, 1GB
RAM), Raspbian OS (Raspbian GNU/Linux 8) and on MacBook Pro (2.9 GHz Intel Core
i5, 8 GB 1867 MHz DDR3, Intel Iris Graphics 6100 1536 MB and MacOS (High Sierra))
then we compare the average latency of the SKA-PS protocol on Raspberry Pi3 and Mac-
book Pro. In our implementation on Raspberry Pi boards, two Raspberry Pi simulating
biosensors, communicate with each other on the wireless medium.
In Section 5.2.1, key generation rates of both models are discussed. In Section 5.2.2,
randomness test results which are based on NIST Test Suite [5], of the generated keys
from the SKA-PSAR system and SKA-PS protocol are given. In Section 5.2.4, distinc-
tiveness and temporal variance results of the models are compared. In Section 5.2.5,
computational complexity, communication complexity and memory requirements results
are compared.
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5.2.1 Key Generation Rates: CKGR and FKGR
CKGR (Correct Key Generation Rate) which is the match rate of reconciled IPI se-
quences measured by the biosensors placed on the same individual and FKGR (False Key
Generation Rate) which is the match rate of reconciled IPI sequences measured by the
biosensors placed on different individuals, obtained from the SKA-PS protocol and SKA-
PSAR system are given in Table 5.1. The 100% CKGR of SKA-PS is achieved when
n = 14 and r = 11. On the other hand, in SKA-PSAR the 100% CKGR is reached when
n = 19 and r = 7, as explained in Section 4.3. The value of r is chosen considering
not only the effective key length of the generated cryptographic keys but also the FKGR
value. When r decreases, FKGR increases in both models. Minimum value of FKGR
can be obtained using the selected r values in Table 5.1. In SKA-PSAR system smaller
required set (r) values can be chosen compared to the SKA-PS protocol. However, in
order to generate the cryptographic key, more utilized sets (n) are needed in SKA-PSAR
system.
Table 5.1: Key Generation Rates of SKA-PS and SKA-PSAR
Parameters
s d m r n CKGR FKGR
SKA-PS 4 1   11
11 83.3 0
12 91.6 0
13 96.6 0
14 100.0 0
SKA-PSAR 4 1 1
7
14 91.6 0
15 93.3 0
16 98.3 0
17 98.3 0
18 98.3 0
19 100 0
8
15 90 0
16 91.6 0
17 95 0
18 98.3 0
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5.2.2 Randomness Tests
The randomness test results of the SKA-PS protocol and our proposed SKA-PSAR
system that are obtained using NIST Test Suite [5] are given in Table 5.2. The detailed
explanations of the tests can be found in Section 4.4.2. Even though, the publication
of SKA-PS protocol [17] does not include randomness test results from the NIST Test
Suite, we re-executed the SKA-PS protocol using the dataset that we have used to test our
SKA-PSAR system in order to obtain SKA-PS randomness results. These results show
that the keys generated in the SKA-PS protocol possess low randomness, since 53.07%
of the cryptographic keys passed 7 tests from the NIST Test Suite on average. On the
other hand, the randomness results of the keys generated in SKA-PSAR system present
that the resulting keys possess high randomness as 96.6% of the generated cryptographic
keys successfully passed 7 tests of the NIST Test Suite.
Table 5.2: NIST Test Suite Results of SKA-PS and SKA-PSAR
SKA-PS SKA-PSAR
Test r = 11 r = 7 r = 8Fail Pass % Fail Pass % Fail Pass %
Frequency (Monobit) 34 26 43.3 3 57 95.0 3 56 94.6
Frequency (Block) 31 29 48.3 4 56 93.3 3 56 94.9
Runs 23 37 61.6 1 59 98.3 3 56 94.9
Longest Run 60 0 0 1 59 98.3 2 57 96.6
N.O. Template Matching 15 45 75 1 59 98.3 0 59 100.0
Approximate Entropy 0 60 100.0 0 60 100.0 0 59 100.0
Cusum 34 26 43.3 4 56 93.3 3 56 94.9
5.2.3 Maximum Number of Candidate IPI Sequences Generated
Table 5.3 gives the maximum number of candidate IPI sequences generated in each
round of the SKA-PS protocol, which depends on the the total number of sets (n). In order
to achieve 100% CKGR in the SKA-PS protocol, maximum 364 candidate IPI sequences
are generated. To obtain 100% CKGR in the SKA-PSAR system, 50388 candidate IPI
sequences are generated, as explained in Section 4.5.1. This significant difference affects
the computational complexity of the models, as will be discussed in Section 5.2.5.
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Table 5.3: Maximum number of candidate IPI sequences generated
Parameters
s d m r n Number of candidate IPI sequences
SKA-PS 4 1   11
11 1
12 12
13 78
14 364
SKA-PSAR 4 1 1
7
14 3432
15 6435
16 11440
17 19448
18 31824
19 50388
8
15 6435
16 12870
17 24310
18 43758
5.2.4 Distinctiveness and Temporal Variance
Distinctiveness is calculated using the hamming distance of the keys generated from
the physiological signals of different individuals. Approximately half of the bits that are
located in the same indices of two binary sequences should be different in order to obtain
the ideal distinctiveness. The average distinctiveness of the generated keys using our
proposed SKA-PSAR system is measured as 49.70% and 49.65%, when r = 7 and r = 8,
respectively. On the other hand, the distinctiveness result of SKA-PS protocol is 49.95%
when r = 11.
Temporal variance is measured using the hamming distance of the cryptographic keys
that belongs to the same individual and are generated in different time intervals. To obtain
optimal temporal variance, half of the bits in the same locations of the binary sequences
should be different. The measured temporal variance results of our proposed SKA-PSAR
system are 49.46% and 48.85%, when r = 7 and r = 8, respectively. Contrarily, the
temporal variance result of SKA-PS protocol is 26.04% when r = 11.
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5.2.5 Computational Complexity, Communication Complexity and
Memory Requirements
In this section, we compare computational and communication complexity of the
SKA-PS protocol together with its memory requirements with that of our proposed SKA-
PSAR system. The computational complexities of our proposed SKA-PSAR system and
the SKA-PS protocol that is measured on Raspberry Pi 3 boards are given in Table 5.4.
The average latency of our proposed SKA-PSAR system and the SKA-PS protocol on
Macbook Pro can be seen in Table 5.5. The latency results imply that both models runs
on Macbook Pro 10 times faster than on Raspberry Pi3. The results also show that the
computational complexity of SKA-PSAR is significantly higher than that of SKA-PS.
In order to reach the same CKGR values SKA-PSAR spends approximately 3000 times
more time as compared to SKA-PS. The reason behind this difference between SKA-PS
and SKA-PSAR is that the number of candidate IPI sequences generated in each round of
SKA-PSAR is greater than that of SKA-PS, which is discussed in Section 5.2.3 in light
of Table 5.3.
Table 5.4: Average latency on Raspberry Pi3
Parameters
s d m r n Round Time (s) Total Time (s)
SKA-PS 4 1   11
11 0.04 0.04
12 0.07 0.08
13 0.11 0.13
14 0.35 0.45
SKA-PSAR 4 1 1
7
14 59.61 178.85
15 74.13 216.29
8
15 102.9 324.01
16 118.579 358.5
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Table 5.5: Average latency on Macbook Pro
Parameters
s d m r n Round Time (s) Total Time (s)
SKA-PS 4 1   11
11 0.005 0.005
12 0.007 0.008
13 0.011 0.013
14 0.040 0.051
SKA-PSAR 4 1 1
7
14 6.85 20.55
15 8.76 27.22
16 23.49 81.22
17 23.49 81.22
18 23.49 81.22
19 36.96 133.70
8
15 12.87 41.25
16 17.71 58.63
17 41.86 148.37
18 66.81 253.65
Communication complexity is measured by the amount of data (in kilobytes) ex-
changed over the network between the communicating biosensors. The average com-
munication complexity of our proposed SKA-PSAR system and the SKA-PS protocol is
given in Table 5.6. The communication complexity of SKA-PSAR is 80   125 times
greater than that of SKA-PS for same CKGR values as the number of generated candi-
date keys in SKA-PSAR is greater than that of SKA-PS, as discussed in Section 5.2.1.
Therefore, the biosensors of the SKA-PSAR system need to communicate more in order
to exchange the keying materials.
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Table 5.6: Average communication complexities (KB)
Parameters
s d m r n Amount of Data (KB)
SKA-PS 4 1   11
11 0.20
12 0.40
13 1.19
14 3.60
SKA-PSAR 4 1 1
7
14 49.95
15 66.72
16 153.77
17 153.77
18 153.77
19 282.77
8
15 118.59
16 158.02
17 305.26
18 555.01
Memory requirement is described as the amount of memory (in megabytes) allocated
for the process running on the host machines during the protocols. The results include all
of the memory requirement of the data and the additional Python libraries, such as OS,
socket, numpy and psutil. The memory requirements of our proposed SKA-PSAR system
and the SKA-PS protocol is given in Table 5.7. In the SKA-PS protocol, the difference
between the memory requirements of the source and the conforming biosensors are neg-
ligible. Even though, on both models the conforming biosensor generates the candidate
IPI sequences in each round as well as receiving the cryptographic keys generated by the
source biosensor, the conforming biosensor’s memory requirement is 3-to-4-fold greater
than the source biosensors in our proposed SKA-PSAR system. The reason behind this
is that the number of generated keys and the computational complexity in SKA-PSAR is
greater as compared to the SKA-PS protocol.
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Table 5.7: Average memory requirements (MB)
Parameters
s d m r n Source Biosensor Conforming Biosensor
SKA-PS 4 1   11
11 11 11
12 11 11
13 11 11
14 11 11
SKA-PSAR 4 1 1
7
14 12 38
15 12 38
16 12 38
17 12 38
18 12 38
19 13 39
8
15 13 38
16 14 39
17 15 40
18 17 41
To sum up, our SKA-PSAR system performs worse in computational, communication
complexities and memory usage metrics as compared to SKA-PS for the same CKGR
values; however, this is a cost that we pay for achieving high randomness rates. Thus, our
SKA-PSAR system provides a trade-off between randomness of the keys versus opera-
tional performance without sacrificing from security.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Body Area Networks (BANs) operate in a wireless environment and are prone to cryp-
tographic attacks. The hardware constraints of the biosensors restrain the usage of con-
ventional cryptographic key generation algorithms. Therefore, a light-weight key gen-
eration algorithm is needed to protect the sensitive information exchanged between the
communicating biosensors.
In this thesis, we have proposed a novel secure key agreement system that utilizes
physiological signals for BANs: Secure Key Agreement using Physiological Signals
with Augmented Randomness (SKA-PSAR). Security of the communication between
two biosensors placed on the same individual is provided by generating the same cryp-
tographic key among them by utilizing their physiological signals on the SKA-PSAR
system. The biggest difference between our proposed SKA-PSAR system and the exist-
ing protocols in the literature is that the former is a comprehensive system that provides
improved randomness.
For the performance analysis of the SKA-PSAR system, BP and ECG signals of 30
individuals are retrieved from the publicly available PhysioBank MIMIC II Waveform
database [20]. We analyzed the performance of our proposed SKA-PSAR system through
correct and false key generation rates, randomness, distinctiveness and temporal variance
of the generated keys together with the computational and communication complexity,
and memory requirements. By using our proposed system, successful key agreement
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rate of 100% between the biosensors of the same person (correct key agreement rate)
and the key agreement rate of 0% between the biosensors of different people (false key
agreement rate) are achieved. Also, 96.6% of the generated cryptographic keys from the
SKA-PSAR system successfully passed 7 tests of NIST Test Suite [5] that proves the
high randomness of the generated keys. As the cryptographic key characteristics require
that the generated keys belong to the same individual should not be the same in different
time intervals (temporal variance property) and also the generated keys of the different
individuals should not be similar to each other (distinctiveness property), Hamming Dis-
tance metric is applied on the generated keys in order to measure the distinctiveness and
temporal variance. The average Hamming Distance is calculated as 49.7% and 49.4% for
distinctiveness and temporal variance, respectively. Since 50% difference is considered
as perfect for both performance criteria, our results show that the generated keys possess
almost perfect distinctiveness and temporal variance. All in all, evaluations of the compu-
tational complexity, communication complexity and memory requirements of the system
show that our proposed SKA-PSAR system provides a good trade-off between security
and complexity such that it is possible to reach 100% correct and 0% false key generation
rates within 133.70 seconds of system run time and using less than 300 KBytes of data
communications and 39 Mbytes of memory usage. On the other hand, 91.6% correct and
0% false key generation rates are possible to be achieved in 20.55 seconds with 50 Kbytes
of data communications and 38 Mbytes of memory usage.
Our SKA-PSAR system is built on SKA-PS [17] with some important differences that
yield higher randomness level. Other than comparison of randomness level, we also com-
pared SKA-PSAR and SKA-PS in terms of other performance metrics. It is possible to
achieve good correct and false key generation rates, distinctiveness and temporal variance
rates. However, SKA-PS computational, communication complexities and memory usage
is much better than SKA-PSAR. Thus, we can say that SKA-PSAR provides a trade-off
between high key randomness and operational performance without sacrificing from se-
curity.
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